Harvesting high value foreign currency transactions from EMV contactless cards without the PIN by Emms M et al.
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV 
Contactless Cards Without the PIN  
 
 
Martin Emms, Budi Arief, Leo Freitas, Joseph Hannon and  
Aad van Moorsel  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1421 May 2014 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1421  May, 2014 
 
Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions 
from EMV Contactless Cards Without the PIN  
 
M. Emms, B. Arief, L. Freitas, J. Hannon and A. van Moorsel 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we present an attack which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected 
from EMV contactless credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the 
cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV 
protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value 
transactions without the cardholder's PIN when the transaction is carried out in a 
foreign currency. For example, we have found that Visa credit cards will approve 
foreign currency transactions for any amount up to €999,999.99 without the 
cardholder's PIN, this side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK.  In 
reality, the criminals would choose a value between €100 and €200, which is low 
enough to be within the victim's balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough 
to make each attack worthwhile. This paper outlines a scenario in which fraudulent 
transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a "rogue merchant" who then 
uses the transaction data to take money from the victim's account. The attack 
described in this paper differs from previously identified attacks on EMV cards, in 
that it can be used to directly access money from EMV cards rather than to buy 
goods. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple 
attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be 
located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are accepted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Newcastle University. 
Printed and published by Newcastle University, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
EMMS, M., ARIEF, B., FREITAS, L., HANNON, J., VAN MOORSEL, A.  
 
Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Cards Without the PIN 
[By] M. Emms, B. Arief, L. Freitas, J. Hannon, and A. van Moorsel 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2014. 
 
(Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1421) 
 
Added entries 
 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1421 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we present an attack which allows fraudulent transactions to be collected from EMV contactless 
credit and debit cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack exploits a previously unreported 
vulnerability in EMV protocol, which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value transactions 
without the cardholder's PIN when the transaction is carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have 
found that Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for any amount up to €999,999.99 without 
the cardholder's PIN, this  side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK.  In reality, the criminals 
would choose a value between €100 and €200, which is low enough to be within the victim's balance and not to 
raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack worthwhile. This paper outlines a scenario in which 
fraudulent transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a "rogue merchant" who then uses the transaction 
data to take money from the victim's account. The attack described in this paper differs from previously identified 
attacks on EMV cards, in that it can be used to directly access money from EMV cards rather than to buy goods. 
The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent 
transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are 
accepted.  
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present an attack which allows fraudulent 
transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit 
cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack 
exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, 
which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value 
transactions without the cardholder’s PIN when the transaction is 
carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that 
Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for 
any amount up to €999,999.99 without the cardholder’s PIN, this  
side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK.  In 
reality, the criminals would choose a value between €100 and 
€200, which is low enough to be within the victim’s balance and 
not to raise suspicion, but high enough to make each attack 
worthwhile. This paper outlines a scenario in which fraudulent 
transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a ―rogue 
merchant‖ who then uses the transaction data to take money from 
the victim’s account. The attack described in this paper differs 
from previously identified attacks on EMV cards, in that it can be 
used to directly access money from EMV cards rather than to buy 
goods. The attack is novel in that it could be operated on a large 
scale with multiple attackers collecting fraudulent transactions for 
a central rogue merchant which can be located anywhere in the 
world where EMV payments are accepted. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.4 [COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY]: Electronic Commerce – 
Cybercash, digital cash, Payment Schemes, Security; 
C.3 [SPECIAL-PURPOSE AND APPLICATION-BASED SYSTEMS]: - 
Smartcards 
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Contactless cards, EMV, fraudulent transaction, foreign currency 
transaction limits, rogue merchant. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our research has identified a practical attack on EMV1 contactless 
credit and debit cards, which allows large-scale ―harvesting‖ of 
fraudulent payments from unsuspecting cardholders.  The attack 
exploits six functional characteristics of EMV contactless credit 
and debit cards: 
 Many EMV credit cards will approve unlimited value 
transactions in a foreign currency; this allows the attack to 
maximise the money extracted from each credit / debit card. 
                                                                
1 EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) is a global standard to 
support interoperable card payment system between Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express and JCB. 
 The contactless interface allows transactions to be extracted 
whilst the card is still in the cardholder’s wallet. 
 The cardholder’s PIN is not required for contactless 
transactions; this allows the fraudulent transaction to be 
extracted from the card without any further interaction from 
the cardholder. 
 Visa contactless cards will approve transactions in offline 
mode; this allows the attack to be performed without 
connecting to the card payment system, thereby avoiding any 
additional security checks by the bank. 
 The merchant details are not included in the data signed by 
the card; this allows the merchant details to be added later, 
making the attack more flexible and scalable. 
 While the EMV protocol requires payment cards to 
authenticate themselves to the Point of Sale (POS) terminals, 
currently there is no requirement for POS terminals to 
authenticate themselves. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the identification of a newly 
discovered vulnerability of the EMV protocol centred on the 
card’s handling of foreign currencies.  This is made possible by a 
combination of the six functional characteristics described above.  
The introduction of EMV contactless cards has created a situation 
comparable to that described by Reason in his ―Swiss cheese‖ 
model [9] where layers of protection can be compromised if holes 
on each layer line up to create an exploitable attack.  In this case, 
the six characteristics line up in a way that defeats the safeguards 
put in place by EMV.  Through this paper we also contribute two 
potential solutions which will block this vulnerability.   
 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions and store them for 
later transmission to a ―rogue merchant‖ makes this attack 
different from previously described relay attacks [1] on EMV 
contactless cards.  The relay attack depends upon very close 
coordination between two attackers; the first attacker has to be in 
contact with the victim’s card whilst the second attacker makes a 
purchase at a POS terminal.  This makes relay attacks difficult to 
operate on a large scale.  Relay attacks are also limited to making 
£20 contactless purchases. 
 
Similar to the ―Chip & PIN is broken‖ attack [3], our attack can 
potentially be operated on a large scale. ―Chip & PIN is broken‖ 
allows attackers to buy goods from retailers, whereas the attack 
described in this paper is different in that it targets the money in 
the victim’s bank account. 
 
The very recent ―Chip and Skim‖ attack [4] is similar to our attack 
in that it could be operated on a large scale and it extracts money 
from the victim’s account.  It would be interesting to explore the 
possibility of using our mobile phone contactless-transaction-
collecting app as the ―skimming‖ platform for the Chip and Skim 
attack. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides 
an overview of the attack, which is composed of two stages: 
collection of fraudulent transactions, and converting these 
transactions into money. Section 3 outlines existing safeguard to 
protect EMV transactions, while Section 4 looks into the EMV 
functionality exploited by the attack. Section 5 outlines the 
experimental software implementation to carry out the attack, 
including an Android app and a rogue merchant server. Section 6 
presents some results from executing the attack, demonstrating the 
feasibility of such attack.  In Section 7 we offer potential methods 
for preventing the attack and Section 8 concludes our paper. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE ATTACK 
Figure 1 shows the key elements of the attack and how they 
interact with the EMV payment system.  
 
 
Figure 1: Transaction harvesting attack 
 
The attack consists of two stages: 
 Attackers (collection of fraudulent transactions): attackers 
using Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled Android 
mobile phones can collect fraudulent transactions from 
unsuspecting cardholders. This can be done whilst the 
contactless card is still in the cardholder’s pocket. (see steps 
1 to 3 of Figure 1). 
 Rogue merchant (converting transactions into money): a 
rogue merchant converts the collected transactions into 
money in their bank account by sending the transaction data 
to a bank. (steps 4 to 5 of Figure 1). 
 
Finally the transaction request enters the Card payment clearing 
system where the rogue merchant’s bank acts innocently to 
transfer the transactions into the card payment system which 
transfers the money from the victim’s bank account into the 
―rogue merchant’s‖ bank account. (see steps 6 to 10 of Figure 1). 
2.1 Collecting fraudulent transactions 
Transactions are collected using a malicious app written for NFC-
enabled Android mobile phones.  The app automatically initiates 
and collects a transaction immediately upon detection of a 
contactless credit / debit card in the phone’s NFC field. This 
process takes less than 500 milliseconds from card detection to 
transaction completion. 
 
It is imagined that attackers will operate in a similar way to 
pickpockets, hiding their activity in crowded situations such as on 
public transport or in the crowd at an event.  When a credit / debit 
card is detected, the app gives the attacker an audible signal 
through their headphones; a second audible signal is given when 
the transaction collection is complete.  This will allow the attacker 
to operate without attracting too much attention. 
2.1.1 Hardware 
An Android mobile phone is chosen as the attack platform due to 
the following reasons: 
 Android mobile phones have a built-in NFC reader. 
 An Android phone is an innocuous item for the attacker to 
carry in a crowded place; for example, it will not raise 
attention if the attacker is stopped by the police, since 
everyone carries mobile phones these days. 
 The mobile phone platform provides portability, Internet 
connectivity and good battery life, making it a very capable 
attack platform. 
2.1.2 The transaction collecting app 
The attack starts when the NFC-enabled Android phone identifies 
a contactless credit / debit card which is vulnerable to this attack 
in the victim’s wallet.  The app sends a transaction request to the 
vulnerable card.  At the same time, it will also play an audible 
alert to the attacker to signal that a vulnerable card has been 
found. 
 
The victim’s card approves the transaction by signing the 
transaction data with its RSA private key. This is possible because 
at the moment, the EMV protocol does not require the Point of 
Sale (POS) terminal to authenticate itself to the card. 
 
The signed data elements are used in the EMV payment clearing 
process as confirmation that the transaction has been approved by 
a genuine EMV credit / debit card.  The signing of the transaction 
data also ensures that the transaction details (such as the 
transaction amount) cannot be changed subsequent to the card 
authorising the transaction.  The app plays a second audible alert 
to notify that transaction collection is complete. 
2.1.3 Storage of approved transactions 
The app was designed to operate in locations where an Internet 
connection is not always available, for example on underground 
public transport. Therefore the app will initially just store the 
transaction authorisation data returned by the victim’s card.  
When a reliable Internet connection is available, the app will send 
the stored transaction data to the rogue merchant who will convert 
the transaction data into money. For the full list of transaction 
authorisation data elements see Section 5.1.5.  
 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions offline and store 
them for later transmission is one of the novel features of this 
attack. This allows the attack to be operated on a large scale. 
 
Furthermore, storing the transactions minimises the time required 
to collect fraudulent transactions as the app does not have to wait 
for a connection.  It also allows the attackers to operate in victim-
rich crowded places that are normally without an Internet 
connection such as on subway trains, on busses and in lifts. 
2.2 Converting transaction data into money 
The criminals would set up a rogue merchant account with an 
acquirer bank in one of the 76 countries that accept EMV 
payments.  This rogue merchant will receive the fraudulent 
transactions collected by the attackers and convert them into 
money by sending the transaction data to the bank. 
 
The rogue merchant consists of three elements: 
 An Internet-based listening service, which will receive 
collected transaction data from attackers. 
 A data format conversion process, which converts the 
fraudulent transactions collected by the attackers into the 
format required by the bank. 
 A ―rogue‖ Point of Sale (POS) terminal, which must imitate 
the actions of a legitimate POS terminal so that it does not 
raise the bank’s suspicion.  To achieve this, the rogue POS 
takes the previously converted data, adds the merchant data 
and sends that data to the bank using an Internet Protocol 
(IP) connection. 
2.2.1 Internet-based listening service 
The rogue merchant provides an Internet-based listening service 
on a pre-arranged IP address and port number, to receive the 
fraudulent transactions from the attackers.  The transactions are 
initially stored to be processed later, once the merchant details 
have been added to the transaction and the connection to the 
acquirer bank is available. 
2.2.2 Data format conversion process 
Financial presentment request messages are used to transmit EMV 
credit / debit card transactions between the merchant (who 
captured the transaction) and the acquirer bank (who will process 
the transaction). 
 
Merchant-related data such as merchant ID, terminal ID and the 
merchant’s bank account details are added to the transaction to 
complete the data required by the EMV card clearing system.  The 
fraudulent transaction is now ready for transmission to the 
acquirer bank. 
 
The exact format of the message will differ slightly between 
different acquirer banks.  However, there are a number of 
mandatory fields that are the same for every acquirer bank.  
Standard 70 [5] in the UK and ISO 8583 [6] in other EMV 
countries define the mandatory data fields which must appear in 
the financial presentment request message and the optional fields 
which may differ between the acquirer banks. 
 
The software for our attack prototype implements a Standard 70 
message format, complete with all of the mandatory fields and a 
number of optional fields (see Section 5).  
2.2.3 “Rogue” POS terminal process 
Once correctly formatted, the financial presentment request 
message is sent to the bank.  The acquirer bank returns a financial 
presentment response message, to which the merchant responds 
with a financial presentment confirmation message that 
acknowledges receipt of the acquirer’s response message. 
 
The supported communication options for this message exchange 
are PSTN, X25 over ISDN, IP over ISDN, and IP over public 
networks (i.e. the Internet) for transmission of messages between 
the merchant and the acquirer bank.  The software implementation 
presented in this paper uses IP over the Internet. 
 
Our software implements data format conversion (Section 2.2.2) 
and implements the sending of the financial presentment request 
message over an IP connection protected by SSL/TLS encryption.   
 
For obvious reasons we were not willing or able to check against a 
real bank. Of course, one approach to defeating the attack is to try 
to detect rogue POS behaviour at the bank, but it is not clear how 
well this can be done. A simple solution would be to have the 
payment card reject any contactless foreign currency transaction 
immediately, but is just not practical. As we will argue in Section 
7, a more effective solution can be implemented by either forcing 
foreign currency contactless transactions to be carried out in 
online mode only, or where that is not possible, to switch the 
transaction to "Chip & PIN". 
3. EMV TRANSACTION SAFEGUARDS 
In the UK, EMV credit / debit cards can perform two different 
transaction types: contactless ―tap and go‖ transactions, and 
contact ―Chip & PIN‖ transactions. 
3.1 Contactless “tap and go” transactions 
Contactless transactions are intended to be a quick and convenient 
replacement for small cash purchases.  In a contactless payment, 
the credit / debit card is placed on the POS terminal’s contactless 
reader for less than 1 second and the payment is approved. 
 
There are two significant differences between a contactless 
transaction and a contact ―Chip & PIN‖ transaction.  First, the 
contact transaction requires the cardholder to enter their PIN, 
whereas the PIN is not required for contactless transactions. 
Second, contact transactions require the card to be removed from 
the wallet and inserted into the POS terminal, whilst contactless 
transactions is completed wirelessly by placing the card on the 
POS terminal, this can be done whilst the card is still in the wallet. 
 
PIN entry provides one of the key safeguards in ―Chip & PIN‖ 
transactions. The PIN ensures that only the cardholder, who 
knows the PIN, can use the card. Contactless transactions are not 
protected by PIN entry.  EMV have therefore implemented the 
following safeguards to limit the potential loss from lost or stolen 
contactless cards: 
 In the UK, each contactless transaction is limited to £20; any 
transaction above this value will require a Chip & PIN 
transaction. 
 EMV cards are limited to five consecutive contactless 
transactions, after which the PIN must be entered in a ―Chip 
& PIN‖ transaction. 
 
These safeguards ensure that the maximum loss due to a lost or 
stolen contactless card is £100. 
3.2 Contact “Chip & PIN” transactions 
The majority of EMV card transactions are ―Chip & PIN‖ 
transactions.  ―Chip & PIN‖ transactions allow purchases up to 
the balance of a debit card or the credit limit of a credit card. 
 
―Chip & PIN‖ transactions are protected by the following 
safeguards.  First, the cardholder must enter their PIN to authorise 
the transaction.  This is used to ensure that the person making the 
payment is the authorised cardholder. 
 
Second, if the value of the transaction is greater than the card’s 
offline transaction limit, the card will request that the POS 
terminal makes an online connection to the bank to perform 
additional authorisation checks.  The POS terminal must connect 
to the bank to provide the card with the online authorisation code.  
The bank will respond with the authorisation code only if the card 
has not been reported lost or stolen, and the account has sufficient 
funds to pay for the transaction.  The card will only authorise the 
transaction if it receives a valid online authorisation code from the 
POS terminal. 
3.3 Cryptographic protection of transactions 
The EMV payment system utilises RSA cryptography to ensure 
that only genuine EMV credit / debit cards can authorise 
transactions. This is achieved by requesting the card to generate a 
digital signature of the transaction data.  This serves two 
purposes: it proves that a genuine EMV card, with a bank-issued 
private key, authorised the transaction; and it prevents the 
merchant from changing the transaction data (e.g. transaction 
amount) after the card has approved the transaction. 
4. EMV FUNCTIONALITY EXPLOITED 
BY THE ATTACK  
The attack circumvents the safeguards built into EMV credit / 
debit cards by exploiting some EMV functionality that has been 
made vulnerable due to the introduction of contactless payment 
interface. In particular, there are three features that are exploited 
in our attack scenario: 
1. Contactless foreign currency transactions. As described in 
Section 3.1, the safeguards built into EMV will limit the 
maximum value allowed for each contactless transaction to 
£20.  Any amount over £20 will require the cardholder to 
enter their PIN, and any amount above the offline transaction 
limit (e.g. £100) will require the POS terminal to connect to 
the bank to perform additional checks before the transaction 
is approved. Our research has found that EMV credit and 
debit cards can be tricked into approving contactless 
transactions of much higher value than £20, simply by 
requesting the transaction in a foreign currency.  In our 
experiments, EMV cards have been found to approve 
contactless transactions up to €999,999.99 without requesting 
the PIN, and without requesting that the POS terminal goes 
online to perform additional checks.  This sidesteps the usual 
safeguards employed by EMV payments system. 
2. Wireless interaction with card. This attack exploits the 
wireless interface on contactless cards to collect transaction 
authorisations whilst the card remains in cardholder’s wallet.  
This means the cardholder remains unaware that they have 
been exploited until their card statement arrives, thereby 
allowing the attack to operate for longer and be more 
lucrative to the attackers. 
3. Merchant data can be added later. The merchant ID and 
terminal ID are not part of the data signed by the card in the 
Application Cryptogram (AC) (Section 5.1.5).  This allows 
the rogue merchant to fill in whatever merchant details they 
wish onto an already approved transaction. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
To validate our research, we have implemented a number of 
software elements which demonstrate the viability and practicality 
of the attack.  The software consists of three separate applications: 
 An Android mobile phone app which captures transactions 
from the cards.  Transactions are stored on the Android 
phone to be transmitted to the rogue merchant later. 
 A rogue merchant Internet listening service which waits to 
receive the captured transactions from attackers using the 
Android mobile phone app. 
 A rogue merchant bank communications module which 
packages the transactions into financial presentment request 
messages for transmission to the bank.  This module handles 
all of the communication with the bank, which involves 
sending the financial presentment request messages and 
receiving acknowledgement messages. 
5.1 Android transaction capture app 
We have implemented the attack platform on an NFC enabled 
Android mobile phone as this would be an innocuous device for 
an attacker to carry around in a crowd. 
5.1.1 Attack platform 
For implementation and testing, we selected the Google Nexus 5 
mobile phone.  Implementing on a mobile phone platform limits 
the effective range to approximately 1 cm.  However in testing the 
Nexus 5 was capable of extracting transactions from an EMV 
contactless card which was located in a leather wallet in the 
pocket of a pair of jeans worn by our ―unsuspecting‖ test victim. 
5.1.2 Android app operation 
The attacker starts by pre-setting the amount and currency for all 
the transactions which will be captured from the victims cards. 
Figure 2 shows the attacker setting the amount to 999,999.00 and 
setting the currency to 0978 which is the code for Euros.  In 
testing we have also obtained transaction approvals in US Dollars 
for $999,999.99 (currency code 0840). 
 
  
Figure 2: Capture transaction settings 
 
The app is now ready and will automatically collect a transaction 
from every EMV contactless card that it detects, without any 
further interaction from the attacker.  This will minimise the 
chance of the attacker being detected, as they are not constantly 
interacting with their phone. 
 
  
Figure 3: Capturing the transaction 
 
In Figure 3 the first screen shows the app waiting to detect an 
EMV contactless card.  The second screen shows the €999,999.99 
transaction being captured from the card. 
 
When the app detects an EMV contactless card, it sounds an 
audible alert in the attacker’s headphones; a second alert is given 
once the transaction has been successfully collected.  This takes 
less than 500 milliseconds.  Once the transaction has been 
captured the app stores the transaction data for transmission to the 
rogue merchant later.  As soon as the app has collected a 
transaction it automatically returns to waiting to detect another 
EMV card is ready to collect the next transaction. 
 
  
Figure 4: Captured transaction data 
 
Figure 4 shows the data elements as captured by the app, this 
includes all of the data and cryptographic authorisation codes 
required by the bank to accept the transaction as genuine. 
 
The mobile app stores transaction data until it has an Internet 
connection, at which point the app transmits the data to the rogue 
merchant. 
5.1.3 Transaction protocol 
The code implements the Visa fDDA [8] contactless transaction 
protocol sequence as this is an offline only contactless protocol.  
This allows the attack to be performed in less than 500 
milliseconds and avoids additional validation by the bank. 
CardTerminal
InitiateTransaction()
PresentCardToTerminal()
ListAvailableNFCApplications()
List of available applications
SelectApplication(AID)
Transaction setup data inc. PDOL list
Command Error
Command Error
GetProcessingOptions(PDOL data)
Transaction Approved - TC + SDAD + 
Application Cryptogram (AC) + AFL
Transaction Must Go Online -ARQC
Command Error
Transaction Declined - AAC
ReadAFLRecord(SFI, Record)
AFL record
[ for each AFL SFI / record ]
RemoveCard()
Loop
GenerateUPN()
GenerateSDAD()
GenerateAC()
UpdateTransactionCount()
DecrementNFCCount()
UpdateAvailableOffline()
ValidateTransaction()
PopulatePDOL()
WaitForCard()
ChooseAID()
SelectTheKernel(AID)
 
Figure 5: Transaction Capture Protocol Sequence 
5.1.4 Storing the transaction data 
The transaction data is sent by the card in TAG / Length / Value 
(TLV) format, the Android application stores all of the data fields 
returned by the card.  The bank requires that the Application 
Cryptogram (AC) from the card be present in the information sent 
to the bank. 
5.1.5 Application Cryptogram (AC) 
When an EMV card approves a transaction, it creates the AC 
which is an 8 byte MAC code generated from the transaction data.  
This ensures that the transaction data cannot be altered after the 
card has approved the transaction and proves to the bank that the 
transaction has been approved by a genuine EMV card.  The 
following transaction data fields are included in the AC: 
 amount authorised (value of the purchase) 
 amount other (cashback amount if required) 
 terminal country code (UK - 0826, USA - 0840 etc.) 
 terminal verification results (POS status code) 
 transaction currency code (UK£ - 0826, US$ - 0840 etc.) 
 transaction date 
 transaction type (purchase - 00, cash - 01, refund - 20) 
 unpredictable number (prevents cloned cards) 
 application interchange profile (card’s security capabilities) 
 application transaction counter (card’s transaction counter) 
 
 Table 1: Financial presentment message data requirements 
 
In the above table data elements from the EMV card data are denoted by their EMV reference number e.g. 0x5A. 
 
 
The AC is sent to the acquirer bank as part of the Financial 
Presentment message (see ).  This allows the bank to verify that 
the transaction details supplied by the merchant are the same as 
the transaction approved by the EMV card. 
 
If any of the data fields in the transaction data have been changed, 
the MAC will be invalid when the acquirer bank checks it. 
5.1.6 Transmission to the rogue merchant 
Our software can collect and store multiple offline transactions, 
without a connection to the Internet.  The stored transactions can 
then be transmitted once a suitable connection is available.  The 
transaction details will include all of the data elements required by 
the bank.  Some of these data elements such as the AC are 
digitally signed by the card to cryptographically protect the 
transaction (see Section 3.3).  The AC is used to by the bank to 
validate that a genuine EMV card approved the transaction. 
5.2 The rogue merchant application 
The rogue merchant application consists of three processes: 
 an Internet listening service to receive the transactions from 
the Android transaction capture app 
 a data conversion module which converts the EMV data in 
TLV format into the ISO 8583 / Standard 70 format required 
by the bank 
Item Name Description and mapping to EMV card data 
1 bit map extended  List of fields included in the message 
2 primary account number  0x5A 16 digit card account number.  This data is included in the Application 
Cryptogram (section 5.1.5) 
3  processing code  Constant 00 for goods and purchases 
4  amount, transaction 0x9F02 the transaction amount.  This data is included in the Application 
Cryptogram (section 5.1.5) 
5  amount, reconciliation  Transaction amount 0x9F02 converted into the currency to be applied to the 
victim’s card, this value is calculated by the rogue POS terminal. 
7  date and time, transmission  Date and time the rogue POS transmits the transaction to the bank 
9  conversion rate, reconciliation Conversion rate for the reconciliation amount, calculated by the rogue POS 
terminal. 
10  conversion rate, cardholder billing  As above; this value is calculated by the rogue POS terminal.  
11  systems trace audit number  Transaction sequence number generated by the rogue POS terminal. 
14  date, expiration  0x5F24 – Expiry date of the card (YYMM) 
16  date, conversion  Date / time of the currency conversion (same as 7). 
19  country code, acquiring institution Country code of the rogue POS terminal (e.g. 0826 - UK, 0840 USA, 0036 
Australia) 
20 country code, primary account number 0x5F28 –Country code for the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
21  country code, forwarding institution 0x5F28 –Country code for the bank that issued the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
22  point of service entry mode Type of POS terminal, constant value ―051‖ for Chip & PIN / EMV 
contactless terminals. 
23  card sequence number  0x5F34 – Identifies subsidiary EMV cards issued on the same 16 digit 
account number. 
25   point of service condition code  Constant ―00‖ normal card presentment. 
26   point of service PIN capture code  Constant ―x8xx‖ indicates a POS terminal that accepts up to 8 digits 
27 approval code length  Constant set by acquirer bank 
32  acquiring institution identification code Constant set by acquirer bank 
33  forwarding institution identification code Constant set by acquirer bank, indicates the institution that will provide the 
card payment clearing (steps 6 to 9 in Figure 1) 
34  primary account number, extended  Not applicable top Visa - used only when the primary account number begins 
with ―59‖ 
39  action code (was response code)  Constant ―0xx‖ for financial transaction request messages 
43  card acceptor name/location  Constant string name and location of the merchant 
49  currency code, transaction  0x5F2A – Currency code of the transaction. This data is included in the 
Application Cryptogram (section 5.1.5) 
50  currency code, reconciliation  Currency code for reconciliation see item 5. 
51  currency code, cardholder billing  0x9F42 - Currency Code from the card. 
66  country code, receiving institution 0x5F28 –Country code for the bank that issued the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
100  receiving institution identification code  Code that identifies victim’s bank - ISO 7812 
102  account identification 1 Information contained in 16 digit card account number 0x5A.   
103 account identification 2 Information contained in 16 digit card account number 0x5A 
 a POS terminal emulation which sends the formatted data to 
the bank to collect the money from the fraudulent 
transactions 
5.2.1 Internet based listening service 
This is a simple Internet based service which listens to a pre-
agreed IP address and port number.  The Android transaction 
capture app (Section 5.1) connects to the pre-arranged IP address 
and port number to send all of the collected transactions to the 
rogue merchant.  The listening service stores the transactions for 
later processing. 
5.2.2 Data conversion process 
The data conversion process accepts TLV data as captured from 
the EMV credit / debit card and converts it into ISO8583 / 
Standard 70 format required by the bank. 
 
To request the money from the victim’s account, the rogue 
merchant must send a financial presentment message (in ISO8583 
or Standard 70 format) to the acquirer bank that holds their 
merchant account. 
 
Table 1 shows the data fields required by the ISO 8583 financial 
presentment message and shows how the rogue merchant will 
complete the data fields from the data generated by the EMV card 
during transaction approval. 
5.2.3 POS terminal emulation 
Once the financial presentment request message has been 
generated, it is sent to the acquirer bank to complete the 
transaction and transfer the money from the victim’s bank account 
into the rogue merchant’s account. 
 
In the UK, communications with the acquirer bank over a public 
IP network must be protected using Secure Sockets 
Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or IPSec [5]. 
 
The use of standard encryption such as SSL/TLS and/or IPSec 
allows the rogue terminal to be implemented in Java on a PC 
platform; no specialist hardware is required. 
 
Table 2 shows the communication sequence required for the POS 
emulation to transmit a transaction to the acquirer bank. 
 
Table 2: POS / acquirer communication sequence 
Message From  
 To 
Purpose 
financial presentment 
request message 
POS  
Acquirer 
Requests approval and 
money transfer by the 
acquirer 
financial presentment 
response 
Acquirer 
 POS 
Contains the answer to the 
request  
financial presentment 
confirmation 
POS  
Acquirer 
Confirms that the response 
was received  
6. TEST RESULTS 
The attack software has been tested against various UK-issued 
credit / debit cards.  Table 3 shows the vulnerability of several 
different card types. 
 
 
Table 3: Vulnerability of UK-issued contactless card types 
Card Type Max value Comment 
Visa credit cards 
(UK currency) 
£85.00 
 
 
 
Visa credit cards will 
approve multiple 
transactions until offline 
limit reached. 
Visa credit cards 
(foreign currency) 
€999,999.99 
$999,999.99 
Visa credit cards will 
approve foreign currency 
transactions up to the 
maximum value possible 
in EMV 
Visa debit cards 
(UK currency) 
£45.00 
 
 
 
Visa debit cards will 
approve multiple 
transactions until offline 
limit reached. 
Visa debit cards 
(foreign currency) 
€0.00 
$0.00 
Visa debit cards decline 
foreign currency 
contactless transactions 
MasterCard  N/A MasterCard is not 
affected by this attack as 
the cards request online 
completion of 
transactions in local 
currency and foreign 
currencies 
6.1 Transaction capture timings 
The Android transaction capture app is designed to operate as 
quickly as possible, thereby reducing the risk of detection for the 
attacker.  The software automatically collects the fraudulent 
transaction as soon as it detects a Visa contactless credit or debit 
card.  Table 4 shows analysis of protocol timings from 20 
captured fraudulent transactions. 
 
Table 4: Fraudulent transaction capture timings 
Statistic milliseconds 
Average transaction duration 
(card discovery to transaction approval) 
478ms 
Standard deviation 36ms 
Fastest transaction 452ms 
Slowest transaction 527ms 
7. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The key weakness exploited in this paper is that Visa credit cards 
will authorise unlimited value transactions in a foreign currency.  
This makes the attack described in this paper both scalable and 
very lucrative. 
The solution is relatively simple, changing future Visa credit cards 
to implement one or both of the following: 
 the cards will request online completion of contactless 
foreign currency transactions; making the transaction subject 
to the additional online verification steps. 
 the cards will force ―Chip & PIN‖ completion of all foreign 
currency transactions; this will eliminate the possibility of 
high value transactions without the added security of 
cardholder’s PIN. 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have demonstrated that it is possible to collect 
high value transactions from contactless Visa credit cards whilst 
the card is still in the victim’s pocket.  The attack exploits a 
previously undocumented flaw in the cards, in which the cards 
will approve transactions of unlimited value in a foreign currency. 
Combined with the lack of POS terminal authentication and the 
threat of contactless payment card skimming, this vulnerability 
poses a real risk that allows high value fraudulent transaction to 
be harvested and converted into money. 
 
Our experimental results show that the attack could be 
implemented in the ―real world‖ as: 
 it takes less than 500milliseconds to collect a transaction 
 NFC enabled Android phones are cheap and readily available 
 the phone looks innocent if the attacker is challenged by the 
police or a member of the public 
 
We have also outlined a scenario by which the captured fraudulent 
transactions could be exploited by a rogue merchant to access the 
money in the victim’s bank account.  The rogue merchant receives 
the transactions and passes them off as genuine transactions to 
their bank.  It should be noted that although we have implemented 
the rogue POS terminal software, we have not tested it against a 
live acquirer transaction clearing system.  
 
From this we can conclude that this attack represents a plausible 
threat to contactless Visa credit cards.  We can also see that it can 
be easily remedied. 
 
We have proposed two simple changes in the operation of Visa 
credit cards that would eliminate the risk posed by this attack.  
Both of which use the existing functionality of the cards and 
would therefore be relatively inexpensive to implement. 
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